{"@context":"http://iiif.io/api/presentation/2/context.json","@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/manifest.json","@type":"sc:Manifest","label":"Things that Happen: Husserl's Theory of Judgment and the Problem of Events","metadata":[{"label":"dc.description.sponsorship","value":"This work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree."},{"label":"dc.format","value":"Monograph"},{"label":"dc.format.medium","value":"Electronic Resource"},{"label":"dc.identifier.uri","value":"http://hdl.handle.net/11401/76611"},{"label":"dc.language.iso","value":"en_US"},{"label":"dc.publisher","value":"The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY."},{"label":"dcterms.abstract","value":"This dissertation develops a phenomenology of events through an application, and critical re-evaluation, of key concepts in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. I argue that non-phenomenological approaches to events fail to account for the availability of `things that happen' as intentional objects. How are they intelligible as objects of thought and experience? Why is their manner of being `things' one in which they happen (rather than exist, for example)? I argue, moreover, that we can best address these questions through a phenomenological analysis of propositions that express what happens--propositions like `My tooth fell out'--rather than nominal expressions like `earthquake' and `wedding'. With this focus in mind, I turn to Husserl's theory of judgment, which provides a framework with which to approach these propositions, and the intentional objects to which they correspond. Husserl's theory treats judgments as meaning-intentions that are directed towards states of affairs. It includes careful analyses of the `synthetic' cognitive activity through which our pre-predicative experience is objectified, generating a new `thing'--a state of affairs-- which is thereafter available as an object of reference.  For Husserl, however, the paradigm of judgment is the copular, property-ascribing judgment `S is p.' I argue that judgments about what happens are unlike property-ascribing judgments, because they are grounded in a different kind of experience. The experience of `happening' is not the experience of `property-having'. To experience happening is rather to intuit the manifestation of force in its effects. Accordingly, the judgments through which we intend and thus objectify the experience of happening--turning it into a `thing'--have (paradigmatically) a different structure than copular property-ascriptions. Rather than ascribe properties to objects, they assign objects to roles in a dynamic structure, in which they participate as e.g. `agents' and `patients' of force. I examine the notion of force mainly in a mechanical context, but argue that it can be usefully expanded to other domains of experience as well."},{"label":"dcterms.available","value":"2017-09-20T16:50:48Z"},{"label":"dcterms.contributor","value":"Casey, Edward"},{"label":"dcterms.creator","value":"Colapinto, Andres"},{"label":"dcterms.dateAccepted","value":"2017-09-20T16:50:48Z"},{"label":"dcterms.dateSubmitted","value":"2017-09-20T16:50:48Z"},{"label":"dcterms.description","value":"Department of Philosophy."},{"label":"dcterms.extent","value":"214 pg."},{"label":"dcterms.format","value":"Monograph"},{"label":"dcterms.identifier","value":"http://hdl.handle.net/11401/76611"},{"label":"dcterms.issued","value":"2013-12-01"},{"label":"dcterms.language","value":"en_US"},{"label":"dcterms.provenance","value":"Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-20T16:50:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1\nColapinto_grad.sunysb_0771E_11431.pdf: 1197323 bytes, checksum: 22e9406218bf64f6481db77bb13c336b (MD5)\n  Previous issue date:    1"},{"label":"dcterms.publisher","value":"The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY."},{"label":"dcterms.subject","value":"Philosophy"},{"label":"dcterms.title","value":"Things that Happen: Husserl's Theory of Judgment and the Problem of Events"},{"label":"dcterms.type","value":"Dissertation"},{"label":"dc.type","value":"Dissertation"}],"description":"This manifest was generated dynamically","viewingDirection":"left-to-right","sequences":[{"@type":"sc:Sequence","canvases":[{"@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/canvas/page-1.json","@type":"sc:Canvas","label":"Page 1","height":1650,"width":1275,"images":[{"@type":"oa:Annotation","motivation":"sc:painting","resource":{"@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/13%2F35%2F24%2F133524246149695185647226126335544231406/full/full/0/default.jpg","@type":"dctypes:Image","format":"image/jpeg","height":1650,"width":1275,"service":{"@context":"http://iiif.io/api/image/2/context.json","@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/13%2F35%2F24%2F133524246149695185647226126335544231406","profile":"http://iiif.io/api/image/2/level2.json"}},"on":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/canvas/page-1.json"}]}]}]}