{"@context":"http://iiif.io/api/presentation/2/context.json","@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/manifest.json","@type":"sc:Manifest","label":"Essays on Two-sided Market: Compatibility and Switching Costs","metadata":[{"label":"dc.description.sponsorship","value":"This work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree"},{"label":"dc.format","value":"Monograph"},{"label":"dc.format.medium","value":"Electronic Resource"},{"label":"dc.identifier.uri","value":"http://hdl.handle.net/11401/78155"},{"label":"dc.language.iso","value":"en_US"},{"label":"dcterms.abstract","value":"This dissertation analyzes the effect of compatibility and switching costs in the context of a two-sided market model. In the two-sided market, the platform provides service which enables two sets of participants, consumers and content developers, to interact. Contrary to the common prediction about compatibility in a one-sided market, compatibility might be harmful to social welfare in the two-sided market. Furthermore, switching cost is closely related to compatibility between platforms and it is magnified compared to the one- sided market. Therefore, applying one-sided analysis to the two-sided market may easily lead to incorrect conclusions. In the first essay of this dissertation, I model competition between two platforms in a two-period model. I explicitly consider the situation in which incompatibility brings about switching cost for the consumer. I show that compatibility increases the price for both consumers and content developers. Differently from a market with direct network effect, where compatibility always increases network benefit, consumers and content developers may be worse off under compatibility in the two-sided market. In the second essay of this dissertation, I build a model of dynamic duopoly competition when two-sided platforms face overlapping generations of consumers. I introduce a stochastic process of the cost of compatibility which evolves according to a Markov process. I focus on finding linear Markov perfect equilibria by solving stochastic dynamic programming numerically. The results show that a platform with a large installed base charges higher prices and obtains a larger market share and profit in the short run. I also examine the effect of compatibility and switching costs on social welfare and policy implications."},{"label":"dcterms.available","value":"2018-03-22T22:39:09Z"},{"label":"dcterms.contributor","value":"Lopomo, Giuseppe."},{"label":"dcterms.creator","value":"Kim, A Ram"},{"label":"dcterms.dateAccepted","value":"2018-03-22T22:39:09Z"},{"label":"dcterms.dateSubmitted","value":"2018-03-22T22:39:09Z"},{"label":"dcterms.description","value":"Department of Economics."},{"label":"dcterms.extent","value":"88 pg."},{"label":"dcterms.format","value":"Monograph"},{"label":"dcterms.identifier","value":"http://hdl.handle.net/11401/78155"},{"label":"dcterms.issued","value":"2017-08-01"},{"label":"dcterms.language","value":"en_US"},{"label":"dcterms.provenance","value":"Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-22T22:39:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1\nKim_grad.sunysb_0771E_13397.pdf: 12127790 bytes, checksum: 943f5b3e618b55c67b29382923ec0ed7 (MD5)\n Previous issue date: 2017-08-01"},{"label":"dcterms.subject","value":"Network externality"},{"label":"dcterms.title","value":"Essays on Two-sided Market: Compatibility and Switching Costs"},{"label":"dcterms.type","value":"Dissertation"},{"label":"dc.type","value":"Dissertation"}],"description":"This manifest was generated dynamically","viewingDirection":"left-to-right","sequences":[{"@type":"sc:Sequence","canvases":[{"@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/canvas/page-1.json","@type":"sc:Canvas","label":"Page 1","height":1650,"width":1275,"images":[{"@type":"oa:Annotation","motivation":"sc:painting","resource":{"@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/12%2F57%2F80%2F125780673309405675415322543173520808682/full/full/0/default.jpg","@type":"dctypes:Image","format":"image/jpeg","height":1650,"width":1275,"service":{"@context":"http://iiif.io/api/image/2/context.json","@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/12%2F57%2F80%2F125780673309405675415322543173520808682","profile":"http://iiif.io/api/image/2/level2.json"}},"on":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/canvas/page-1.json"}]}]}]}