{"@context":"http://iiif.io/api/presentation/2/context.json","@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/manifest.json","@type":"sc:Manifest","label":"Time, or the Idea of the Good","metadata":[{"label":"dc.description.sponsorship","value":"This work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree."},{"label":"dc.format","value":"Monograph"},{"label":"dc.format.medium","value":"Electronic Resource"},{"label":"dc.identifier.uri","value":"http://hdl.handle.net/11401/76608"},{"label":"dc.language.iso","value":"en_US"},{"label":"dc.publisher","value":"The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY."},{"label":"dcterms.abstract","value":"Emmanuel Levinas describes the face-to-face relationship with another as an \u00e2\u20ac\u0153ultimate situation.\u00e2\u20ac  In this relationship, Levinas argues, we bear witness to an affection, coming from another, which is of a distinctly ethical nature: a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153calling into question of oneself, a critical attitude which is itself produced in the face of the other and under his [or her] authority.\u00e2\u20ac  Obviously, by calling this relationship \u00e2\u20ac\u0153ultimate,\u00e2\u20ac  Levinas means to say that it in some sense signifies the highest sort of dignity to be found in our lives. And yet, this is not the only or, in fact, even the fundamental sense in which Levinas uses the term \u00e2\u20ac\u0153ultimate\u00e2\u20ac  here; for seen in its proper connection with time-consciousness\u00e2\u20ac\u201dthrough which subjectivity is fundamentally self-constituted, as Husserl as well as Heidegger, each in his own way, was able to discover\u00e2\u20ac\u201dthe face-to-face relationship also signifies for us the critical determination of subjectivity, or its \u00e2\u20ac\u0153ultimate\u00e2\u20ac  condition, on Levinas\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s account: \u00e2\u20ac\u0153time itself refers to this situation of the face-to-face with the Other,\u00e2\u20ac  he writes. But if this is so\u00e2\u20ac\u201di.e., if subjectivity necessarily presupposes a consciousness of time, while for its own part, time-consciousness does just as necessarily presuppose a relationship of an ethical nature spurring it on its way\u00e2\u20ac\u201dthen subjectivity must in some sense be counterpart to ethical responsibility. To be subject, essentially involving time-consciousness, would be, at heart, an ethical affair. In the following study, I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122ll attempt to clarify just what this claim can mean, and to demonstrate that it is in fact the case. In order to do so, I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122ll need to show, firstly, that subjectivity necessarily involves time-consciousness: a demonstration that will primarily work through Husserlian and Heideggerian analyses of the phenomenon. But then, secondly, I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122ll have to demonstrate that time-consciousness must ultimately be stirred or brought forth by an ethical encounter with another, an affection which calls into question the very being of the one made subject by delivering him or her over to the others in concern for their well-being or in fear of doing violence to them. By working through Levinas\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s analyses on the relation between sensation, time-consciousness, and ethics, I will ultimately be able to both fully clarify the basic sense of my thesis, and to demonstrate it: at basis, we will discover, the primordial time-consciousness of subjectivity attests to a questionability of the subject\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s own being, brought by another. The demonstration, which is thus in a sense \u00e2\u20ac\u0153meta-ethical,\u00e2\u20ac  will for this very reason also uncover several basic dilemmas of our moral condition, from which subjectivity cannot be divorced by virtue of the questioning that subtends it."},{"label":"dcterms.available","value":"2017-09-20T16:50:47Z"},{"label":"dcterms.contributor","value":"Craig, Megan"},{"label":"dcterms.creator","value":"Coate, Matthew Blair"},{"label":"dcterms.dateAccepted","value":"2017-09-20T16:50:47Z"},{"label":"dcterms.dateSubmitted","value":"2017-09-20T16:50:47Z"},{"label":"dcterms.description","value":"Department of Philosophy."},{"label":"dcterms.extent","value":"429 pg."},{"label":"dcterms.format","value":"Application/PDF"},{"label":"dcterms.identifier","value":"http://hdl.handle.net/11401/76608"},{"label":"dcterms.issued","value":"2015-05-01"},{"label":"dcterms.language","value":"en_US"},{"label":"dcterms.provenance","value":"Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-20T16:50:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1\nCoate_grad.sunysb_0771E_12266.pdf: 2661244 bytes, checksum: 75fb8d853605eca730dfb12af39b4699 (MD5)\n  Previous issue date: 2015"},{"label":"dcterms.publisher","value":"The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY."},{"label":"dcterms.subject","value":"Consciousness, Ethics, Phenomenology, Time"},{"label":"dcterms.title","value":"Time, or the Idea of the Good"},{"label":"dcterms.type","value":"Dissertation"},{"label":"dc.type","value":"Dissertation"}],"description":"This manifest was generated dynamically","viewingDirection":"left-to-right","sequences":[{"@type":"sc:Sequence","canvases":[{"@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/canvas/page-1.json","@type":"sc:Canvas","label":"Page 1","height":1650,"width":1275,"images":[{"@type":"oa:Annotation","motivation":"sc:painting","resource":{"@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/50%2F82%2F79%2F5082798515567766372411663998905089491/full/full/0/default.jpg","@type":"dctypes:Image","format":"image/jpeg","height":1650,"width":1275,"service":{"@context":"http://iiif.io/api/image/2/context.json","@id":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/50%2F82%2F79%2F5082798515567766372411663998905089491","profile":"http://iiif.io/api/image/2/level2.json"}},"on":"https://repo.library.stonybrook.edu/cantaloupe/iiif/2/canvas/page-1.json"}]}]}]}